**List of Abstracts**

**20-21 March 2020**

**Sciences Po, Reims Campus**

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All abstracts are listed in alphabetical order by last name.

**Panel 5A: reframing conceptions of the public/private in (early) European State formation**

**The Hundred Years War at Sea: *armées* and naval careerism in fourteenth-century England**

**Dr Andrew Ayton, Keele University**

In late medieval England, the ‘public’ and ‘private’ domains in the organisation and conduct of warfare co-existed, interacted and, most importantly, sustained each other. While this is the familiar and accepted context within which historians of land-based armies and campaigning have worked, the blurred public/private boundary that was particularly evident and consequential in the maritime sphere has received rather less attention. Given how much the sea shaped the course and character of the Hundred Years War, such neglect has surely impaired our understanding of the English war effort. This paper will consider one aspect of the problem, namely the English crown’s heavy reliance on the domestic merchant fleet of privately-owned shipping and commercial seafarers for the fulfilment of its naval requirements. The logistical dimension of this – the shipping of armies and supplies to France and elsewhere – exploited the resources and skills of the merchant fleet while permitting at least some coordination with commerce. More pertinent as maritime counterparts to the contract armies employed on land were the fleets, packed with soldiers, that were raised for a fighting role at (and from) the sea. Termed *armées* in the records of the period, fighting fleets of armed merchantmen stiffened by royal warships emerged as an essential feature of the English war effort during the 1370s and ‘80s, a period of intensive, attritional warfare. In addition to looking briefly at the operational role of *armées*, this paper will examine their composition, in terms of shipping and manpower, an investigation made possible by the survival of an abundance of pay records. It will also assess whether, through their active support of the war at sea as a potentially profitable supplement to their commercial lives, some English shipmasters and mariners should properly be considered naval careerists: the maritime counterpart to the military careerists who had become so notable a feature of the land-based warfare of the period.

**Panel 4A: Civil-Military relations of war in memory and media**

**‘Why the war was won: the adoption of ‘just war’ rhetoric and cultural associations with the Second World War in British veterans’ accounts of the Falklands Campaign, 1982’.**

**John Beales, PhD Candidate, Imperial War Museum and University of Keele**

In the immediate aftermath of the Falklands Campaign the combination of its short-lived nature, the limited media coverage, the rhetoric of victory and the ‘feelgood factor’ resulting from the promulgation of the idea that it was a ‘just’ war, led to the conflict becoming mythologised as a moment of national regeneration. Underlying these sentiments was the belief that the conflict was the historical successor to Britain’s ‘Finest Hour’. In turn these factors engendered the popular perception that a British victory was inevitable, a view fostered by many veterans in personal testimonies, despite extensive evidence to the contrary.

This paper discusses the way in which British veterans of the Falklands Campaign framed their expectations of combat, composed their memories of the conflict and measured their military performance by referencing cultural associations with Britain’s role in the Second World War. In doing so I argue that they have facilitated a public memory of the conflict that is not representative of the reality of the Campaign.

**Panel 1: The implications of the Public/Private divide for history & political science**

**A Critical Examination Of The Private Army Of The East India Company And Modern Corporate Security Companies.**

**Dr Kevin Blachford, Baltic Defence College**

The aim of this paper will be to examine the private armies of the British East India Company (EIC) and to provide a historical contextualization of the role of private force in modern security practices. The armed forces are often seen as a modernizing agent and an important part in the development of the nation state, but the Presidency Armies of the EIC developed as a private force to provide colonial policing and contract enforcement in Mughal India. The private army of the EIC represented a hybrid form of polity which blurred the lines between the public and private sector. The EIC was a ‘company state’ with its own form of sovereignty, but concurrently, relied on support from the Crown and Parliament. Conventional accounts of European expansion stress the military revolution within Europe and its transfer to the Indian subcontinent. I will argue that the rise of European military forces was intertwined with the use of private force in colonial expansion. The East India Company's military forces acted as contract enforcers for private profit. In looking to this historical example of private warfare, this paper will also aim to present lessons and conclusions for today’s context of private military contractors.

**Panel 5B: from financing war to manufacturing war machines**

**War and the Social Meaning of Money**

**Dr Jonathan Boff, University of Birmingham**

Money, famously, makes the world go around, but it remains poorly understood. Traditionally, economists and thinkers such as David Hume, Adam Smith, and Max Weber tended to see money *qua* money as an abstract, impersonal, colourless tool. Its effects, as Karl Marx and Georg Simmel argued, might include the destruction of social relations and alienation, but in itself it could be seen as the technically perfect and infinitely interchangeable medium of modern rational economic exchange.

More recently, however, sociologists such as Geoffrey Ingham, Nigel Dodd, and Viviana Zelizer have begun to stress the fact that money is far from culturally neutral and socially anonymous. It is intimately entwined with important social relations, exists in multiple different forms, and matters in very different ways in a variety of important contexts. Money has, in fact, a social meaning. This idea is old hat to early modern historians: scholars such as Margot Finn, Mary Poovey and Deborah Valenze who have studied early modern money are all very sensitive to its functional instability. Modern historians, in contrast, have tended to pay it less attention and even to take money for granted.

The purpose of this paper is to review these ideas and then sketch out the possibilities for filling the consequent gap in our understandings of modern money by exploring how it has been used and perceived under conditions of the greatest possible stress: in wartime. How might we test the strength of money’s social relations when society itself is strained to the limit or worse? Does it still make sense to talk of the social meaning of money? What might the answers to these questions mean for how we understand money itself?

# **Panel 4B: Cold War Irregulars**

**Outsourcing Violence: The Serbian War-making Tradition and Paramilitaries**

**Dr Stevan Bozanich, Simon Fraser University**

This paper follows the ways in which the Serbian state used paramilitaries to wage conflicts in the 20th-century. Beginning with the Balkan Wars, 1912/1913, the Serbian state used guerrilla fighters, known as *četniks*, to cleanse “Old Serbia” and “Southern Serbia” (Kosovo and Macedonia, respectively) of non-Serbs. This practice continued throughout the interwar period under the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. An important moment came in 1941 with the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia. Popularly known as the Chetniks and led by Yugoslav Army Colonel Dragoljub “Draža” Mihailović, Mihailović successfully outsourced much of the violence to other Chetnik units in Montenegro, Hercegovina and Dalmatia. This allowed Mihailović to claim plausible deniability at his war crimes trial in 1946. The Communist period provided calm. Only during the Yugoslav Wars of Succession, 1991-1999, did the prospect re-emerge. Again, the Serbian state employed non-state actors, some of whom adopted the Chetnik name, to cleanse non-Serbian populations from their territories, the most notorious of which was the 1995 Srebrenica genocide. Though the region has since enjoyed peace, Serbian paramilitaries have sought new avenues. When Russia annexed Crimea and Donbass, as many as two dozen Serbian men “volunteered” for the Russian state. Incorporated into the mercenary group “Wagner,” the Serbians again adopted the namen and look of the Chetniks from the Second World War. This paper argues that the recent phenomenon of Chetniks fighting for Russia is the latest evolution in the Serbian war-making tradition. They play an integral role in Russia’s attempt to re-align the geopolitical map, but the legacies to which they attach themselves is long. This paper seeks to situate the Serbian war-making tradition within its proper context to get at a better understanding of the ways in which conflict can be imbued with historic symbolism, importance, and precedent.

# **Panel 4B: Cold War Irregulars**

**The “Affreux” in Congo (1960-1967): mercenaries coming back in a historically-specific context**

**Professor Walter Bruyère-Ostells, Sciences Po**

The beginning of postcolonial African history is characterized by the major role of mercenaries in an evolution of conflicts that have become infra-state but inserted in a global context. It can be observed until nowadays. The Congo from 1960 to 1967 is destabilized by rebellions and secessions, making possible a long and important presence of mercenaries coming from Africa but also from Europe or America. The Congo has been thus seen as an example of the retour of mercenary activities, a timeless phenomenon. In reality, this communication aims to show through personal trajectories (of mercenaries coming from the three continents) how this return actually can be explained by a very specific context.

By following these personal trajectories, the communication will endeavor to show that this presence is the result of an accumulation of factors : the challenge of mining resources that leads the mobilization of the Belgian business community and settlers (non-State actors) in a neocolonial sense, the support of Belgian militaries, convergences with Portuguese Angola or with the White states of southern Africa, the French will to reinforce her “pré carré”, the Cold war context guiding indirect action of the United States.

The paper will also show this new mercenary activities are built on personal motives that needs to question the actor category of mercenary, usually opposed to the category of foreign fighters. The communication is mainly based on Belgian and French administrative archives, private archives of mercenaries and declassified archives of CIA.

**Panel 1: The implications of the Public/Private divide for history & political science**

**Crack troops or bloody killers? States, political parties, and mercenaries 1800-2018**

**Dr Matteo Cesare Mario Casiraghi, University of Milan**

Why do states and other political actors adopt different attitudes toward the market for force? What are the reasons behind anti-mercenary hostility? The article presents a book project on political attitudes toward mercenaries and private military and security companies in Europe. Analysing and coding more than 200 years of parliamentary debates and other sources in different countries, the paper offers insights about different nuances of the relations between hired soldiers and political units in Italy, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Belgium. First, the article presents the evolution of the anti-mercenary norm, showing how a very weak norm born during the XIX century becomes extremely politicized over the years, and then eventually disappears in recent times. Then, the project focuses on political parties, highlighting the dimensions that explain parties’ different postures toward the market for force. In particular, preferences toward privatization policies in general, the global balance of power, and the military format contribute to shape such positions. More, the article presents a huge dataset on references to mercenaries and contractors in different European Parliaments, employing quantitative and qualitative techniques to code and analyse the debates. Overall, the project generates significant implications for the literature on norms, showing how a norm is born, how it evolves and how it may disappear. Then, the article contributes to the literature on mercenaries and security contractors, highlighting the reasons of principle and need that explain political attitudes and behaviours toward hired soldiers. These dimensions may be helpful to investigate public-private relations in other fields of security affairs, as studies on terrorism or piracy. Finally, relevant implications regard texts as data, as the original mixed-methods approach of the projects opens new paths for future research on parties and foreign policy, parliamentary studies, and rhetorical political analysis.

**Panel 6A: the public/private voice of war**

**Rethinking the “Rage Militaire”: Popular War Enthusiasm and the British State, c. 1739-1801**

**Dr Jon Chandler, University College London**

War enthusiasm and war weariness are usually assumed to play a principal part in determining how any state will respond to conflict. Recent scholarship has begun to establish that the conflicts of the twentieth century were conducted with public sentiments very much in mind. In particular, historians of the First World War have begun to question the depth of the unstoppable popular passion for war that appeared to take hold of Europe at the beginning of the conflict. The global wars of the eighteenth century, however, are normally assumed to have been conducted by elite actors largely shielded from the pressures of popular opinion.

This paper will challenge this enduring interpretation by uncovering the capability of ordinary people in the early modern period to influence decisions to go to war and make peace. The eighteenth-century was a period in which Britain fluctuated between war and peace, victory and defeat, success and catastrophe. These oscillations had vastly different effects on different types of people in different regions. It was also a period of substantial social and economic advancements, accompanied by increased awareness of emotion in both private and public spheres. In other words, this was a period when people were becoming more understanding of emotional expression, and more conscious of their ability to affect political change.

Through an examination of popular responses to declarations of war and peace, this paper will argue that the emotional responses to war that were circulated in newspapers and correspondence, or publicly expressed on the streets, were conspicuously, even if unintentionally, political. Correspondents, editors and ordinary people were assuming that their display of emotion would deliver some response, while from their often unsuccessful efforts to manipulate war enthusiasm it would seem that policy-makers were more concerned by public opinion that has been previously thought.

**Panel 5B: from financing war to manufacturing war machines**

**Public meets private? The Fatio and the Calandrini in late 17th-century Geneva**

**Dr John Condren, University of Oxford**

In the middle decades of the seventeenth century, Geneva slowly began to regain some of its former significance as a financial hub – a role it had last truly enjoyed in the 1400s. Historians such as Antony Babel and Raymond de Roover have described it as the “clearing fair” for bills of exchange in the fifteenth century, thus rendering it a crucial part of a financial network stretching from Venice and Florence to London, Lyon, Augsburg, and Bruges. In the seventeenth century, the city’s stature in this regard received a welcome boost due to an influx of French Huguenot merchant families, as well as Protestants fleeing persecution in the north of Italy. This paper examines the fortunes of two prominent banking families of Italian descent who were linked to one another by blood and marriage ties: the Fatio (originally from the Val d’Ossola) and the Calandrini (from Lucca). François Fatio acted as a broker for other Genevan, Swiss, and Lyonnais merchants vis-à-vis the French crown. Fatio also involved himself in the supply of specie from Italy to Lyon in the mid-1690s. His own commercial interests – from which he profited handsomely – needed the continuation of war, and also a powerful financial backer in France. This last would prove to be Samuel Bernard, whose importance to the French was undisputed.

These families held prominent positions in the Genevan government, including places on the *Petit Conseil*. Their private interests occasionally grated with their public responsibilities, which included a duty to avoid embroiling the city too deeply in the conflict which raged in Haute-Savoie and northern Italy in the early 1700s. Nonetheless, Geneva was already known to be the principal centre of remittances for Louis XIV, and this paper discusses the rôle of the Fatio, the Calandrini, and other important Genevan families in this important financial network.

**Panel 3A: Rescuing the state? Does the private sector help?**

**The public and private costs of humanitarianism in the Middle East: Red Cross work in Jordan and Yemen from the 1940s to the 1970s**

**Dr Rosemary Cresswell, University of Hull**

Influxes of refugees repeatedly entered Jordan in the years following the Second World War. Starting with conflict in Palestine, and then continuing troubles in Yemen, Jordan was a major destination for people seeking refuge. This subject remains highly relevant in the 21st century, with the UN arguing Yemen is the country in most need of humanitarian aid (UN, 2019), and Jordan hosts the second largest number of refugees pro capita in the world (UNHCR, 2019). It has been argued that Jordan has the world’s largest number of refugees compared to its indigenous population (Chatelard, 2010), which still includes a large number of Palestinians, as well as the recent influx from Syria.

How was this cost to Jordan financed between the 1940s and 1970s, and how were arguments for international responsibility and fundraising made in the immediate post-Second World War and post-colonial context, including by the recently established United Nations? The British Red Cross provided significant assistance for people arriving in Jordan and this paper concentrates on the activities of the Red Cross movement, through the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (the League), which co-ordinated National Societies, and the British Red Cross. In terms of national societies, the focus of this paper is on the British Red Cross, but various countries’ Red Cross or Red Crescent societies were involved, including Finland, Bulgaria and Kuwait. To what extent and why did the International Red Cross Movement and particular national Red Cross societies take responsibility for Jordan’s burden? This area of the world allows the immediate post-world-war, post-colonial period to be studied from the late 1940s, through to the 1970s, with the complexities of independence of Jordan, and Palestine and Israel at the beginning of this period, and the withdrawal of British troops from Aden in 1967. Public and private mechanisms for funding humanitarian activities are discussed, along with the human costs of fleeing conflict. Jordan, Palestine and Yemen are used as a case study for examining the financing of aid, the co-ordination and logistics of the supply of resources, including aid workers, and the international charitable response to the human costs of conflict. The research on the League is funded by an Australian Research Council Discovery Project.

**Panel 3B: Shadow War into the 21st century**

**Corporatisation of intelligence: Perpetuating the targeting cycle?**

Rupert Culyer, PhD Candidate, University of Sussex

The contemporary battlespace is framed by the individuality of its construction. The counter terrorism campaigns of Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen and many others have progressively narrowed the focus of what Bousquet refers to as ‘the martial gaze’ to the level of the person reconstituted as an individual unit of infrastructure. It is through the relationship between units of human infrastructure that the enemy is understood. However, finding these units of infrastructure is neither a purely technical process, nor one that is fully directed by humans. The socio-technical system of rendering intelligence data into targets requires both man and machine to work together in a cultural milieu dominated by an assumption that first and foremost targets must be found.

Much of the contemporary labour and technology on which the US armed forces’ targeting system rests is outsourced to the private sector. Technology is supplied by Silicon Valley giants such as Palantir or IBM. Their tools structure sensitive intelligence into networks of people and objects and project them onto a virtual geography of the battlefield to enable targeting. Intelligence specialists who use this software are in effect imprinting cybernetic thought derived from Silicon Valley onto the world, their tools filtering intelligence in order to fit their assumptions. Outsourced, contract intelligence analysts and targeteers are expected to bring with them the core skills needed to drop into the milieu of the targeting system and adapt rather than to engage with a discourse around institutional values. The consequences of this may be that outcomes are not challenged, and the socio-technical system protects itself from change. It is therefore arguable that the outsourcing of the targeting system perpetuates a vision of not only what constitutes a target on the battlefield, but also an overriding assumption that targets must exist.

**Panel 5A: reframing conceptions of the public/private in (early) European State formation**

**“To the Interest of the Royal Service”: Catalan military enterprisers and the Spanish Army during Philip V second reign (1724-1746)**

**David Ferré, PhD Candidate, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona**

The ending of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) indelibly marked the political interests and military ambitions of Philip V of Spain. The bloody final act of the conflict, distinguished by the strong military resistance to Bourbon rule lead by Catalan authorities, lasted until the fall of Barcelona on September 11, 1714. The military success of Bourbon armies on the Iberian theatre of war meant the political, martial and administrative transformation of Catalonia, setting an important garrison to prevent any future attempt of revolt. Those troops had to be housed, fed, equipped, and on occasion, deployed overseas at the Crown’s will. Only three years after the Peace of Utrecht (1713) and Rastatt (1714), Spanish regiments landed on Imperial controlled Sicily starting another continental war. This would only be the first of a series of campaigns and military actions framed in what has traditionally been described as the “Mediterranean Irredentism” of Philip V. The continuous cycle of warfare endured by the Spanish Army and Navy, invigorated local military entrepreneurship as its main source of supplies. Several Catalan companies embraced the growing flow of provisioning contracts issued by the Spanish military administration. Their activities ranged from the building and provisioning of local garrisons to the supplying of key military equipment to the expeditionary forces deployed on Italian soil. Our future paper aims to analyse the nature of the contracts they performed and the eventual economic and political benefits they entailed. We will also examine the key role of dynastical loyalty or social mobility as incentives to join this type of business. To do so, several particular cases of contractors from different social backgrounds will be examined and compared. Some of them will be the gunsmith Josep Serrat, the tailor Antoni Casanovas, the merchants Josep and Jaume Duran or the master baker Jaume Clota.

**Panel 5A: reframing conceptions of the public/private in (early) European State formation**

**Mercenaries and the *Mary Rose*: rethinking Tudor naval warfare**

**Professor Catherine Fletcher, Manchester Metropolitan University, and Sam Nelson, Swansea University**

This paper reconsiders the presence of foreigners in the crew of Henry VIII’s ship the *Mary Rose* in light of recent archaeological investigations of human remains from the wreck. Built in 1510, the *Mary Rose* sank in 1545, was raised from the seabed in 1982, and is a vital historical resource for understanding everyday life in the sixteenth century. Until this year, interpretation at the Mary Rose Museum had been based on the assumption that the ship’s crew was primarily English. However, analysis of the human remains published in 2009 had questioned that; a 2016 project assessing the viability of 3D modelling for ancestry estimation further raised the possibility that one of the crew was African. Subsequent isotope analysis of eight skulls by Madgwick and Scorrer established that one crew member is likely to have been of Spanish descent, one Italian, one North African and one brought up in England but of North African ancestry. Media coverage of these findings extrapolated from them a cheerful image of a multicultural Tudor England. We argue, however, that we should return instead to the proposition that the Tudor navy incorporated a significant mercenary contingent (first raised by Bell, Thorp and Elkerton in response to the 2009 research). Drawing on previous work by Fletcher on foreign state servants in Tudor diplomacy and on Potter’s discussion of England’s involvement in the international mercenary market in the 1540s, our paper builds on the analysis of Bell et al to situate the *Mary Rose* crew in the wider context of Mediterranean warfare in the mid sixteenth century, and to make a case for the importance of interdisciplinary research in understanding the history of mercenary warfare.

**Panel 5B: from financing war to manufacturing war machines**

**“I Print, Therefore I Am”: Legitimacy and Resistance through Money**

**David Foulk, PhD Candidate, University of Oxford**

The Free French movement was born of necessity. Resisting the twin forces of fascism and governmental apathy came not from having a predefined ‘idea of France’ but rather an inability to accept a future in which France would become a vassal of the Third Reich.

This unwillingness to accept defeat would have come to naught were it not for the help of their allies. The rallying of certain African, Pacific and North American French colonies, in late 1940 and 1941, represented a deviation to the movement’s trajectory which had, up to that point, functioned as an auxiliary of the British and Commonwealth war effort. However, through the acquisition of sovereign power, economics became a pressing concern.

Were the Free French monetarily sovereign? They required the support of H.M. Treasury and the Bank of England to ensure the uninterrupted provision of currency to the colonial administrations. From the perspective of the Free French, the colonies provided a source of goods and manpower (Jennings, 2014). In order to continue transporting goods and raw materials, as well as sustaining the new recruits, a functioning currency was an absolute necessity.

The increase in transfer speed, via telecommunications, meant that international financing became a distinct possibility. Nonetheless, transporting bundles of cash was as much a difficulty as transporting goods or people; all faced the same risks during wartime travel. The Free French delegations provided a rallying point for fund-raising activities which, in turn, were transferred to Carlton Gardens, the movement’s London headquarters, or, later, to Algiers.

Allied collaboration in the economic sphere was a recognition of the practical importance of the Free French to the war effort, just as the growth of U.S. Lend-Lease transfers reflected a tacit acceptation of their wartime role, despite their uncertain diplomatic status among the other governments-in-exile.

**Panel 3A: Rescuing the state? Does the private sector help?**

**Principal-Agent Problems:**

**USG Use of Contractors to Deliver Security Force Assistance (SFA)**

**Dr Whitney Grespin, Defence Studies Department, King’s College London**

Although private contingency contracting firms can contribute to building partner military capacity and may be a useful foreign policy tool, the impact that these non-state actors have must be taken into consideration to avoid weakening the perception of the sponsoring (in this case, the United States’) government’s legitimacy. Therefore, the question must be asked, “Why do U.S. policymakers often turn to private firms and individuals in order to deliver training and advisory services to build the capacity of partner militaries, rather than relying on America’s own military personnel?”

This research delves into the practices of privately delivered USG-directed partner nation military training programs delivered in Afghanistan within the bounds of the G.W. Bush and Obama administrations of 2000-2016 by contractors rather than U.S. military personnel.  In order to understand the incentives that the USG has to contract out such work that was previously under the purview of the U.S. military, this project applies Principal-Agent (P-A) theory to the topic. On balance, the USG’s use of contractors to supplant traditional U.S. military roles in building partner capacity has utility, but it is not unbounded nor without lasting repercussions.

**Panel 4A: Civil-Military relations of war in memory and media**

**Remembering the dead: The Falklands war, repatriation of bodies and the changing relationship between Army and society**

**Professor Helen Parr, Keele University**

In the aftermath of the 1982 Falklands War, political attention focused on Margaret Thatcher’s celebration of victory. Less noticed at the time were changes in the practices of memorialising the dead, namely, the repatriation of bodies of soldiers from the Falkland Islands to mainland UK, for families who requested it.

Repatriation of these bodies marked the beginning of a shift in the relationship between the armed services and British society, and also, perhaps, a change in the relationship between the state and the service personnel who fought for it. The public attention to the burials of these soldiers, and the focus on the wishes of their families, illustrated that, as Britain moved away from the living memory of total war, service personnel were no longer seen chiefly as military men, dying in service of their country and buried together where they fell, but as individuals, who had chosen the military path; individuals with families who loved them.

Over time, and in the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, those sentiments became more pronounced. The rituals of repatriation, and the passage of bodies through what became Royal Wootton Bassett indicated a more sentimental, and arguably inward-looking, public attitude towards British military dead, and a tendency to regard servicepeople not as servants of the state, but as victims of combat, or even victims of government policy.

Those shifts suggest that the Army is both more distant and separate from wider society but also regarded more favourably within it, thereby privileging soldiers, military families and veterans as deserving of the state’s attention. This paper suggests that those changes are not exclusively reactions to the defeats in Iraq and Afghanistan, but stem also from longer-reaching political and social changes in a British society for whom memory of war has been important.

**Panel 2A: (un)Settling Civil-Military Relations in the late 19th and early 20th century**

**Nations Indivisible? Professions of Arms, Civil War Era America, and the Modern World**

**Dr Wayne Hsieh, US Naval Academy**

In its broad sweep, the nineteenth century seems to bear out Max Weber’s analysis of the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory”. By the time of World War One, we see nation-state armies superseding private military forces in order to mobilize the material and organizational resources we commonly associate with modernity. Historians have rightly associated this mobilization with the professionalization of public nation-state armies that mastered new military technologies that emerged over the course of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the process by which states nationalized military labor into regular armies was “ambivalent,” to use the term C. A. Bayly ascribed to modernity. By looking at American military laborers fighting and working outside of the United States in the mid-nineteenth century, sometimes with the explicit sanction of the American nation-state and sometimes in defiance of it, I hope to further highlight the ambiguities and ambivalence at the center of the nation-state monopolization of force via regular armies. The professionalization of nation-state armies laid bare tensions between the need to master new technologies and the desire of military professionals to see themselves as something more elevated than mere technicians of violence enthralled to their machines. Whether in the Taiping Civil War, or in the Japanese expedition to Formosa in 1874, or in Egypt under Ismail Pasha, the checkered careers of American military contractors laboring outside the United States showed that professional competence in western military technologies need not be tightly associated with the moral aspirations of western military professionals serving nation-state armies, and that non-western states could separate the material competencies of those professionals from western assumptions about modernity, the nation-state, and the public regular armies that claimed a monopoly on violence.

**Panel 6B: Freedom of Warfare: An Historical Phenomenon with Contemporary Implications**

**Manifestations of Western Political Extremists in Syria**

**Dr Ariel Koch, Independent Scholar**

The study on contemporary forms of political violent extremism in the West focuses mostly on Islamist extremists (i.e. Salafi-Jihadists) and far-right extremists. Jihadi terrorism, immigration, and the presence of Salafi-Jihadists in the West, devoted to the implementation of the Sharia in non-Muslim countries while supporting foreign terrorist organizations and their actions, have triggered the rise of the “counter-Jihad movement” and right-wing terrorism. This process, in which one form of extremism provoke a reaction from another form of extremism, has been described as “cumulative extremism” and “reciprocal radicalization”. However, both Jihadists and right-wing extremists triggered another counter-reaction, from left-wing extremists. devoted to confronting “fascism” either in its right-wing or Islamist forms.

These three forms of political extremism consider violence as a legitimate, justified and necessary act to stop the "enemies"; and that is not limited to a specific geographic area. Accordingly, war in Syria and the rise of the Islamic State (IS) has prompted a reaction from both right-wing and left-wing extremists, attracting some of them to the Middle East, to participate in the war against the IS. Among these anti-IS foreign fighters we can find combat charities, state-sponsored mercenaries, neo-Nazi militant groups, neo-fascists and counter-jihadists, anarchists and militant anti-fascists. What is known about the anti-IS foreign fighters? Why did they come to Syria? do they pose a threat like the Jihadists?  The lecture will shed light on this aspect of the war in Syria; on the transnational networks behind these foreign fighters; their ideologies, modes of recruitment and mobilization, and the challenges they pose.

# **Panel 4B: Cold War Irregulars**

# **Private and Irregular Warfare Re-reading the Works of Thomas Eduard Lawrence**

**Dr Olaf Meuther, Independent Scholar**

Looking at warfare, the private and the public correspond with the regular and irregular. When groups decide to wage wars with irregular troops, private interests are in the foreground, whether to free themselves from the domination of their own country controlled by rulers of another state, or to improve fundamentally their own situation.

As US soldiers tried to arrest Saddam Hussein in 2003, soon, a joke circulated that in all palaces the soldiers found the volume of the 14th edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica containing the article on the Guerilla Warfare written by Thomas Eduard Lawrence. While the regular combat troops are still struggling with the irregular fighting units which are getting their information to push their aims along that way. Based on the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review where irregular warfare was predicted to be that of the 21st century, the US Department of Defense decided to prepare American troops to conduct such a war. The use of privately held troops means that the mercenaries have to wage an irregular war, even though the democratization of the arms trade makes these troops better equipped and better trained than, for example, the indigenous units in the Arab Revolt.

Thus, it is advisable to re-read the critical writings of Thomas Eduard Lawrence to indicate what it means to outsource traditionally public task to the private sector. Which dangers threaten the client of private fighting troops? How can control be exercised over the private fighting troops? Answers to these and many other questions about warfare with the help of private troops can be found in the writings of Thomas Eduard Lawrence. That is what my talk should be about.

**Panel 4A: Civil-Military relations of war in memory and media**

**"When I'm not killing complete strangers I'm an out of work drunk": Representations of the Mercenary in *The Wild Geese***

**Dr Jeff Michaels, King’s College London**

This paper critically examines representations of mercenaries in the 1978 film *The Wild Geese*, set against the more general theme of the mercenary being used as a pawn by the private and public sector in post-Colonial Africa. More than any other film, *The Wild Geese* is widely considered the classic mercenary film. It confronted particular stereotypes of mercenaries prevalent at the time, particularly their role in African conflicts in the 1960s, and in some key respects tried to humanize them. At that time, the mercenary was often equated to being a criminal, most notably by the UN General Assembly, and the film attempted to distinguish them from other types of criminals, including African dictators, American drug-dealing Mafiosi and merchant bankers profiting off of conflict. The film also evoked many contextual issues such as morality and ethics in conflict, race and class relations, sexual identity, corporate greed, the secret state and British decline. After discussing these wider themes, the paper will focus on the backgrounds of five of the mercenaries to highlight the different types of individuals working as mercenaries and their motives for doing so: Colonel Allen Faulkner, the cynical leader of the mercenary operation, Captain Rafer Janders, the intellectual and idealistic mercenary, Lieutenant Pieter Coetzee, the white South African farmer, Regimental Sergeant Major Sandy Young, the brutal and highly loyal NCO responsible for preparing the mercenaries for battle, and Medical Orderly Arthur Witty, the homosexual doctor. In addition to examining the mercenaries, the study will also discuss two other characters, Sir Edward Matheson, the merchant banker, and Rushton, the secretive civil servant, as representatives of the corporate and government interests without whom the mercenary phenomenon would not exist.

**Panel 2B: creating the soldiers of the state**

**Orphans of the Empire. Goals and motivations of the officers of the former Imperial Russian Army during the Russian Civil War period (1917-1921)**

**Rafal Mieczkowski, PhD Candidate, Nicolaus Copernicus University**

Before the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, the Officer Corps of the Imperial Russian Army was commonly considered a „backbone” of the political system of the Empire and the main support to the Tzar's throne. Yet after two Russian revolutions of 1917, annihilation of the army and almost complete destruction of previous social structures, the remaining officers were forced to choose their sides at the outbreak of new, bloody conflict over control of former Empire's territories. But their motivation to join either the Red Army, the White Movement, the Greens/Blacks or various national forces varied drastically from case to case. While some Russian commanders were driven by their beliefs, ideology or desire to protect their homeland, others were tempted by the opportunity of making career or gaining personal wealth and fame in times of chaos; switching sides (sometimes more than once!) was also frequent.

In this paper, my main goal will be to present the process of „shattering” the previously-united Officer Corps by explaining in detail previously mentioned social, ideological and economical motivations. I intend to use the career patchs of several ex-Imperial officers as an examples of various moral stances, as well as several statistics about the Officer Corps as a whole. The whole work will be based on Russian sources and books.

**Panel 6A: the public/private voice of war**

**The Private Soldier in Public Consciousness: Classifying Military Professionals in Early Modern Germany**

**Louis Morris, PhD Candidate, University of Oxford**

Modern scholarship has increasingly tried to transcend lazy stereotypes of Early Modern ‘mercenaries’ and ‘soldiers of fortune’ by developing more nuanced understandings of their precise role in fiscal-military networks. Nonetheless, the rise of new academic categories for classifying military enterprisers and their relationship with state actors needs to be accompanied by efforts to answer another question; namely, how did contemporary observers perceive the identity and ‘ownership’ of the soldiers whom they encountered? As an example, in the modern world, we are used to predominantly identifying soldiers according to the nation-state which employs them (i.e. as British troops, US troops, etc). In Early Modernity, however, the category used for identification varied constantly according to the circumstances and observer, meaning that the same unit might be referenced using their ethnic background, religious confession, town where they were stationed, faction they were fighting for, commander’s name, or that of the ruler who had hired them. This paper is an attempt to systematically assess some of these categories, examine how their usage developed over time, and consider what this means for our understandings of private and public warfare.

The specific case-study used will be the Lower-Rhine-Westphalian Circle in the decades immediately prior to the Thirty Years’ War. Conflicts such as the Dutch Revolt and the Cologne War brought military professionals from across Europe to the area during this period, when it was central to changing dynamics of warfare such as the Orange-Nassau military reforms. By examining how soldiers appear in Circle records (which document discussions between local actors of all confessions about military crises), the paper tests out a number of ideas; in particular, it considers the important question whether there was a shift from seeing mercenary units as private property of their officers to seeing them as agents of a state employer.

**Panel 6B: Freedom of Warfare: An Historical Phenomenon with Contemporary Implications**

**Mercenaries, foreign fighters and military contractors: historical and contemporary intersection and overlap**

**Jethro Norman, PhD Candidate, University of Leeds and Dr Nir Arielli, University of Leeds**

Historians and social scientists have long assumed the existence of an anti-mercenary norm in European and North American societies. They established a teleological narrative that traces the development of warfare from the early modern period to the twentieth century and highlights the gradual side-lining of mercenaries. However, in recent years assumptions about a pervasive anti-mercenary norm have increasingly been questioned and critiqued.

Our paper contributes to this debate by examining three ostensibly distinct categories of military personnel: mercenaries, foreign fighters and private military/security contractors. By focusing on a number of historical cases from the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, as well as some present-day examples, we argue that there is a degree of overlap between these categories.

First of all, we illustrate how Cold War mercenaries and contemporary contractors share certain characteristics with foreign fighters. European and North Americans who fought in Congo in the 1960s and in Rhodesia in the 1970s were often referred to as mercenaries. However, they also invoked various ideological considerations such as anti-communism and white supremacism to justify their engagement in these conflicts. A similarly distinctive set of ideological, moral and ethical considerations also underpin the justifications given by contractors of European descent in present-day Somalia. Moreover, like foreign fighters, both Cold War mercenaries and contemporary contractors search for meaning in a conflict zone, a meaning they cannot find at home or by doing non-military jobs.

Secondly, we show that while some foreign fighters view the ‘mercenary’ title as pejorative, others – especially when they enlist to fight for right-wing causes – embrace it. For instance, during the wars in Yugoslavia in the 1990s, some of the foreigners who fought in Croatia and Bosnia referred to themselves as mercenaries, even though their wages were very low by Western European standards. We argue that for these individuals, the term mercenary conveys broader political meanings than simply being motivated by material gain. To further illustrate the blurred boundaries between the three categories, we examine some contexts in which contemporary security contractors embrace the mercenary title, and in doing so highlight the appeal that adventurism and romantic images of the ‘frontier’ still exercise today.

**Panel 3A: Rescuing the state? Does the private sector help?**

**Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), a Trade-off between the Sovereignty and Survival of Failed States in Contemporary International Politics: A Case Study of Afghanistan**

**Anuradha Oinam, PhD Candidate, Jawaharlal Nehru University**

Privatisation of security is one of the most emerging new trends of security studies in contemporary international politics. In current days, individuals, states, corporations and international organisations depend heavily on services provided by Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) both in strong and failed states. As the failed states are in the worst scenario to run the government effectively, PMSCs come into play to fill such vacuum and try to ease the threats posed by local warlords, terrorist networks, international criminals, and drug cartels, which have been spawned lately. In fact, PMSCs are not the choice of the failed states but a necessity for their survival in contemporary society. The emerging trend of PMSCs has been debated since it raises the sovereign question of failed states due to transfer of legitimate monopoly use of force by states to private forces.

Afghanistan is always a weak state and it is in the verse of collapse. Her income depends from outside powers and the national government was always unable to implement the power outside Kabul. Besides, insurgencies, autonomous militias and government forces, private forces took part in fighting wars. However, building states and to regulate the privatisation of military and police functions are the crucial issues endeavouring in Afghanistan.

This research paper will analyse the emerging role of PMSCs in failed states in recent times. Some of the important questions are: 1) what are the importance of PMSCs in failed states? 2) How do PMSCs thrive in failed states? 3) Is PMSCs a trade-off between the sovereignty and survival of state in Afghanistan? Thus, in contemporary international politics, PMSCs do play a very important especially in failed states to stabilise the chaos ambience despite its notoriety and ambiguous natures. This paper will follow the deductive approach to understand the pattern and regulation of PMSCs in failed state by taking up the case study of Afghanistan.

# **Panel 4B: Cold War Irregulars**

**The Nigeria-Biafra War: the mercenaries and the ‘humanitarians’**

**Dr Arua Oko Omaka, Alex Ekwueme Federal University**

Mercenaries were elusive and intriguing elements in the Nigeria-Biafra War. Biafra and Nigeria hired their services from Europe, Egypt, and South Africa. Interestingly, neither Nigeria nor Biafra admitted their existence, but each accused the other of engaging the services of foreign private soldiers whose technical skills played a significant role in shaping the debates and outcome of the war. While some of the private soldiers served for pecuniary rewards, others volunteered their services on ‘humanitarian’ grounds. Count Carl Gustaf von Rosen from Sweden was a famous private pilot, who fought on the side of Biafra because of the terrible effects of the blockade-induced starvation in Biafra, and his efforts made headlines in the international media during the war. Yet, some prominent private contractors such Hank Warton and Rolf Steiner served in Biafra for monetary reasons. Surprisingly, little is known about these mercenaries and their strategic roles, which had profound impacts on the conflict. Although the warring parties engaged the services of mercenaries, this paper focuses on the role of the private soldiers in Biafra. Using archival documents in the UK, the USA, Nigeria and Canada, the paper argues that the combat mercenaries were largely a wasteful investment and that the war destroyed the reputation of the mercenaries.

**Panel 6B: Freedom of Warfare: An Historical Phenomenon with Contemporary Implications**

**Who should fight? The use of German mercenaries in the American Revolutionary War and their construction as illegitimate fighters**

**Helene Olsen, PhD Candidate, King’s College London**

When Lord North, the British Prime Minister, suggested, in February 1776, the hire of German troops to support efforts against American rebels in North America, the suggestion was met with loud outcries from the British Parliamentarians. One of the more outspoken was Frederick Bull, MP for the City of London, who ended the debate in the Commons with a scorching address declaring that the German mercenaries would be ‘hired to subdue the sons of Englishmen and of freedom’ and lamented that the measures taken against America were ‘inimical … to the honor, faith, and true dignity of the British nation.’ Bull saw the German mercenaries as illegitimate fighters and constructed them as such with his utterance.

This paper will investigate not only why the German mercenaries were constructed as illegitimate fighters, but also how this construction impacted the organisation of violence in Britain. Ultimately, this paper will argue that the moral objection made towards mercenaries and the widespread dislike of these actors is more than just an expression of a norm against mercenary use, as Sarah Percy has argued. Rather than saying something fundamental about mercenaries as actors, the moral objections and the subsequent de-legitimation of mercenaries are an expression of the struggle to articulate the proper organisation of violence and therefore who *should* fight. As will be shown in this paper, the German mercenaries were so vehemently objected against because they were seen as disruptors of the ideal British polity. The use of the German mercenaries spoke to the very issue of how to best organise violence and, thus, how best to organise society.

**Panel 5A: reframing conceptions of the public/private in (early) European State formation**

**Public initiative and private enterprise in medical care during the British Civil Wars.**

**Dr Ismini Pells, University of Leicester**

Recently, historians have argued that the British Civil Wars elicited a dramatic improvement in the treatment of military casualties and resulted in important developments in medicine that established precedents and standards with which later provisions and objectives can be directly compared. Yet, central to the significance of this claim remains the fact that both king and parliament relied heavily on medical care for their military casualties provided by ‘non-professional’ civilians: local inhabitants in frontline towns and garrisons, especially women, cared for the wounded in their own homes. For example, the numbers of maimed soldiers cared for in private homes in the aftermath of the major battles often exceeded the capacity of the military hospitals administered by parliament in London.

However, petitions to local and central authorities representing the king or parliament, and the account books of these authorities, demonstrate that the rival state powers reimbursed civilians for caring for military casualties. The extent to which Civil War medical care was ever truly ‘private’ is thus questionable, though civilian caregivers varied in how far they petitioned for total reimbursement, costs were rarely met in full and soldiers often became indebted paying for their care themselves. Furthermore, in negotiating repayment for medical care with the authorities, civilians commonly protested their allegiance and/or adopted the language of king or parliament (depending on whose casualties they had treated). Regardless of how far such sentiments might be regarded as sincere, political language and protestations of loyalty reinforced the rival sides’ claims to legitimacy and their power as rulers over the supplicant. Nevertheless, alongside these state influences, private enterprise flourished. The conflict yielded regular supplies of casualties, which provided an economic opportunity for some civilian carers. Correspondingly, the evidence suggests that the Civil Wars provided the environment in which nursing as a specialised occupational identity thrived.

**Panel 2A: (un)Settling Civil-Military Relations in the late 19th and early 20th century**

**Soldiers and ideology: civil-military relations at the time of the first Blum government and French foreign policy (June 1936 – June 1937)**

**Emanuele Podda, PhD Candidate, University of Warwick**

Scholars generally agree that civil-military relations remained tense in France throughout the inter-war period.. Extensive studies have been conducted especially as far as the first half of the 1930s is concerned, concentrating on the controversial figure of General Weygand (Bankwitz, 1967; Horne, 1984). By contrast, only recently researchers have started to engage with the immediately following period, namely the aftermath of the April-May 1936 elections that delivered a Popular Front majority. However, French historians, such as Catros and Vidal, have tried to downplay the influence of ideology in the formation of the attitude of French soldiers. Indeed, on the one side they have maintained that it would be wrong to lump all general officers under the banner of reaction and anti-communism; and on the other side, they have advanced the claim that realist considerations, rather than ideological ones, would have been determinant in their foreign-policy preferences. This paper, by contrast, will argue that a specific kind of military ideology, not exempted from the influence of rightist milieus, was mainly at work in the formation of French general officers’ opinion on domestic affairs and their foreign-policy preferences. This study attempts on the one side to reconstruct this ideological background through specific reference to the articles appeared, throughout the 1930s, on ‘La France Militaire’, the official journal of the French army; and on the other side, to show, also by referring to a significant amount of unexploited documentation available at the archives of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, how this set of beliefs worked in the direction of establishing a deep-seated mistrust vis-à-vis the Blum-led coalition. In turn, this led general officers to either indirectly or influencing foreign-policy making, decisively contributing both to the failure of Franco-Soviet staff talks and to the decision for non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War.

**Panel 5B: from financing war to manufacturing war machines**

**Between the Air Ministry and the Airframe Industry: public-private partners and the maintenance of strategic aircraft production in Britain**

**Dr Matthew Powell, Portsmouth Univeristy**

There has always been a degree of friction between private arms manufacturers and the state which requires the fruit of their collective labours. One of the most prominent and long-lasting of these relationships was between the Air Ministry of the Royal Air Force (RAF) and the private airframe and aero-engine firms of the aircraft industry in Britain during the inter-war period. With the reduction in demand for aircraft due to a surplus of aircraft orders almost non-existent and any work was limited to re-conditioning work. Many firms found it difficult to survive in a climate that saw reduced expenditure on aircraft due to a concentration on social policy and relative revulsion at the use of war as a tool of foreign policy. With relative limited orders aircraft firms sought to exploit the relationship that existed with the Air Ministry to create an environment more suited to their short-term tactical outlook rather than the long-term strategic outlook of the Air Ministry. For the majority of the inter-war period, the aircraft firms were concerned that they would not survive as going concerns from one business year to the next. The Air Ministry wanted to develop strategic capacity that could be utilised in the event of a major war. This friction would continue through the rearmament of the RAF as the individual firms looked to avoid investing their own money in expanding their productive capacity and sought to exploit the fears of both the Air Ministry and the wider government that they would lose their positioning in the world and an ability to influence European and global politics without an air force.

**Panel 2B: creating the soldiers of the state**

**“The surest of all morale barometers”: Encounters between foreign fighters and their hosts in the Spanish Civil War**

**Dr Fraser Raeburn, University of Edinburgh**

Thanks to their prominent role in global conflicts in recent years, so-called ‘foreign fighters’ – individuals who participate in conflicts in which their home state is neutral, for primarily ideological reasons – have become the focus of a rapidly-expanding field of the study. Yet as scholars such as Nir Arielli have shown, this is a phenomenon with long historical roots. The Spanish Civil War offers a particularly vital point of reference, having seen the largest single mobilisation of foreign fighters in the twentieth century. Most served in units known as the International Brigades, fighting for the Spanish Republican government against a fascist-backed military coup.

Despite the scale of existing scholarship on the International Brigades, the methodological choices made in most historical studies have led to some surprising areas of neglect. Most studies concentrate on particular national groupings of foreign fighters in Spain, ignoring or downplaying the reality that serving in Spain involved a series of transnational encounters. While scholarship is paying increased attention to the so-called ‘national question’ in the International Brigades – the relations between various national contingents – the most obvious category of transnational encounter has been neglected: the interactions between foreigners and their Spanish hosts.

This paper presents the result of research into the nature of these encounters, drawing on new Spanish archival material to build a fuller picture of what encounters between foreign volunteers and their local counterparts were like. Rather than being the product of immediate circumstances, it is argued that everyday relations reflected deep structural ambiguities surrounding the nature and motives of the International Brigades themselves, linked as much to the mode of transnational mobilisation as the specific political context. This in turn suggests wider lessons for understanding the role foreign fighters play in other conflicts.

**Panel 2A: (un)Settling Civil-Military Relations in the late 19th and early 20th century**

**Pals, Bantams and Gorgeous Wrecks: Feudal Armies on Merseyside 1914-1918**

**Stephen Roberts, PhD Candidate, Manchester Metropolitan University**

Traditionally, the British have been fearful of standing armies and, by the early twentieth century, were concentrating more on building the navy than on expanding the country’s land forces. Germany’s invasion of Belgium in August 1914 necessitated sudden military expansion – a task which was performed in a typically British fashion, involving pragmatism, voluntarism and the use of regional government and social networks. Where they existed, the aristocracy often played a role. One of the most powerful noble families in England, the Stanleys of Knowsley Hall near Liverpool, through their scion, the Seventeenth Earl of Derby (1865-1948), made an enormous contribution by raising the four Liverpool ‘Pals’ Battalions, three of which were part of 89th Brigade and commanded by the Earl’s brother, F.C. Stanley. The event is possible evidence of either the survival or resurrection of feudalism, but the Pals were not the only units to be raised by individuals: the 13/Cheshire Regiment or ‘Wirral Pals’ were raised at the same time by industrialist J.H. Lever at Port Sunlight; and Conservative M.P. for Birkenhead, Alfred Bigland (1855-1936) raised two ‘Bantam’ Battalions (15/ and 16/Cheshire Regiment), while other local gentlemen formed battalions of over-age volunteers and drilled them on their lawns.

Using recent primary research, these are the questions which I will begin to answer in this paper.

* What do these stories tell us about Britain’s class structure in the early twentieth century and the degree to which warfare either had always been or once again became a partly privatised business run by local elites?
* What was the relationship between the government, the elites and the soldiers who served them and where does the story fit in the long-term development of British attitudes to the armed forces?

**Panel 3B: Shadow War into the 21st century**

**Outsourcing Security, Managing Risk: Hiding the National Security State in Global Markets**

**Dr Kaija Schilde, Associate Professor, Boston University**

Why have modern states increasingly outsourced security and defense to private actors? This puzzle is particularly salient because a key element of the modern Westphalian state is that its institutions legitimately control violence. However, states--primarily but not solely the US--have been outsourcing significant aspects of domestic and foreign security processes to private, market actors. US law states that security, policing, intelligence, surveillance, incarceration, and defense should remain core governmental, not market, functions. The conventional wisdom is that states outsource security for efficiency or cost reasons. In contrast, I propose that privatization of security policies and processes are the result of state attempts to make politically sensitive policies in security more opaque, by taking them out of the public policymaking sphere. The logic of outsourcing is inherently an attempt to hide the most sensitive aspects of statecraft from public democratic oversight, particularly in sensitive areas such as security, justice, migration, and defense.

To measure the relationship between citizen oversight and state outsourcing behavior, I used computational text analysis to evaluate Freedom of Information (FOIA) Requests of the US government from 1965-2019 and US government contracting data over the same period.  I hypothesize and find that increases in transparency requests in a given security area will produce increased government outsourcing in that area, either intentionally or unintentionally to obscure security activity from civilians. This suggests that neoliberalism and privatization are not exogenous to war, but are a means for states to reduce transparency and political risk by hiding state security activity from their citizens. This has myriad consequences, from embedding the security state away from democratic oversight, to creating security markets and interest group constituencies that did not previously exist, reducing state capacity in providing security as a public good over time, and shifting defense and security risk to the private sector.

**Panel 6A: the public/private voice of war**

**“The Loss of the Italian Voice in the Military History of the Wars of Italian Unification”**

**Professor Frederick C. Schneid, High Point University**

The Wars of Italian Unification are central to the creation of a unified Italian state, but the non-Italian military histories of Europe often subsume the conflicts to French, German or Austrian narratives. This historiographical reality began during the course of and immediately following the wars. For the purpose of this paper and limits on time, I will examine the Second War (1859-1861), and Third War of Italian Unification (1866). In part the Second War is a victim of chronology, coming on the heels of the American Civil War and the Wars of German Unification. Indeed, shortly after the Second War the Prussian General Staff produced its history of the Italian war. It paid specific attention to France and Austria, the two states with whom the Prussians intended to fight in the near future. The French military histories, however, beginning with the official account published immediately after the war, focused on the achievements of the army of the Second Empire and the enhanced reputation of Napoleon III.

The Third War of Italian Unification (1866), was a product of an Italo-Prussian alliance against Austria. The results of that conflict were decisive in terms of the fate of Germany, but the narrative of the campaign in Italy typically ends with the Austrian victory over the Italians at Custoza, rather than its actual conclusion in August 1866. Indeed, the military histories of 1866 are squarely focused on the campaign in Bohemia that culminated in the Battle of Koniggratz. Discussions of the campaign in Venetia are cast as secondary. The Austrian accounts elevate their dramatic defeat of the Italian army, in order to compensate for their humiliating defeat at the hands of the Prussians. There was in fact, a successful Italian campaign in the Tyrol, and a second invasion of Venetia in July 1866. These are rarely discussed in non-Italian military histories, particularly when they are contextualized in terms of German unification.

Beyond the national narratives that emerged in France, Germany and Austria, the Italian military histories were late to publication after these wars due largely to the complex politics of unification, and the defining of what was a “national narrative” after 1861 and in the wake of the humiliating defeat at Custoza in 1866. This paper will therefore trace the historiographical facets of national narratives related to the Second and Third Wars and understand how the Italian voice was lost in a series of wars that forged a unified Italian state.

**Panel 6B: Freedom of Warfare: An Historical Phenomenon with Contemporary Implications**

**North Africa’s Foreign Fighters: Legal and social challenges**

**Dr Lisa Watanabe, ETH Zurich**

Thousands of people left their countries to fight in Syria, Iraq, and beyond, for the most part in the name of Islamic State (IS). At the peak of the group’s successes, it attracted an estimated 40,000 foreign fighters – a figure far higher than that for other major jihadi mobilizations. North Africans made up a significant contingent of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. They also travelled to Libya following the creation of an IS enclave in the conflict-stricken country, given its proximity and ease of access. Some foreign fighters married and had children in ISIS-held territories.

North African states now face the challenge of repatriation, rehabilitation and reintegration of foreign fighters and their families. This paper examines the legal challenges linked to prosecution of individuals who have committed foreign fighter-related offences, as well as approaches to and challenges of rehabilitation and reintegration into society of returned foreign fighters and their families.

**Panel 4A: Civil-Military relations of war in memory and media**

**The Civil Service welcomes outsiders: recruitment of private sector experts driving film propaganda forward during WW2**

**Robert Williamson, PhD Candidate, Oxford Brookes University**

This paper explores the work of Kenneth Clark and John Betjeman within the initial creation of the Films Division of the Ministry of Information (MOI) during the period 1939 to 1940. It draws on various sources, including archive material as well as memoirs, which express a range of opinions about their work during the war. Its focus is on the various pressures they were under to promote films of a certain type and form. From this we can get some understanding of the British Government's aims and desires for film-making in Britain during these early days of the war. As outsiders from industry, they brought new ideas and plans which were not generally welcomed with the Civil Service. At the start of war being declared, the threat of invasion and being bombed from the air reinforced a feeling of dread that affected the whole country. But the civil service did not rest, as there were bureaucracies to set up and run. The main aim of the Films Division was to enlist Cinema in the cause of national propaganda, but that’s not how it worked out as the initial setup became bogged down in that very bureaucracy.

Both men became very famous in later life within the broadcasting medium of television; Clark for the BBC series Civilisation, and Betjeman for many TV shows, on subjects as varied as poetry, trains and art. Both met at Oxford University in the 1920s and kept in touch through the 1930s. These two men being chosen was, at that time, a revolutionary step by the Civil Service and I shall explore how this came about. Time and again the references supply examples of their cooperation with each other. Once Clark had been installed as the Films Division head, he wasted no time in recruiting his old friend from the Evening Standard film review pages. It was not all plain sailing, as on later occasions Clark had to defend his friend. Betjeman did not have a high regard for authority, especially within the civil service ranks, and did cause friction on many occasions.

**Panel 1: The implications of the Public/Private divide for history & political science**

**Public, Private or Personal: Wallenstein and the nature of military power in early modern Europe**

**Professor Peter H. Wilson, University of Oxford**

Albrecht Wenzel Eusebius von Wallenstein (1583-1634) has been represented as the ultimate personification of the private military contractor. Often dubbed ‘the last condottiere’, he has been widely presented as exemplifying a crucial transition from private to public war-making that supposedly occurred in the mid-seventeenth century as European states established standing armies. Crucially, Wallenstein has been held up as a warning of the dangers of privatising war. Called by the emperor to raise 24,000 men in 1625, he immediately set about organising twice that number and then proceeded to expand this still further at the expense of neutral and enemy territories during the Thirty Years War (1618-48). Already perceived as a threat to the established political order, Wallenstein was dismissed in 1630, only to be recalled 18 months later as seemingly the only man who could reverse a dramatic deterioration in the emperor’s fortunes. Finally, Wallenstein was murdered on the emperor’s orders in February 1634 when it appeared he was acting on his own account. The conventional narrative of his career thus suggests that military outsourcing was an expedient, only used unwillingly because the state was either unable or unwilling to cope with the new forms of warfare developing since the early sixteenth century. Moreover, Wallenstein is contrasted with his principal opponent, the Swedish king Gustavus Adolphus, who is widely credited as the ‘founder of modern warfare’ (Liddell Hart) and the forger of Europe’s first genuine ‘national army’. The broader conventional interpretation of the Thirty Years War as an imperial defeat has been woven into the narrative of the inevitable superiority of the classic form of ‘public’ warfare through state-controlled, national armies, over ‘private’, ‘mercenary’ forces.

This paper interrogates the standard view of Wallenstein and his place in military and political history to question public/private boundaries in the early modern European organisation and use of armed force. It will argue that the conventional narrative is a distortion that not only does injustice to the complexity of history, but poorly serves the interests of political science in trying to comprehend contemporary warfare. It will also highlight the significance of the ‘personal’ alongside impersonal institutions in the organisation of states and armed forces.

**Panel 3B: Shadow War into the 21st century**

**Offensive cyber operations and intelligence: tracing the emergence of a privatized warfare domain**

**JD Work, Columbia University and Marine Corps University**

The recent recognition in contemporary military doctrine of information as a warfighting function, and cyberspace as a domain of warfare, is the much belated codification of a reality that has been shaped over decades of competition and conflict between rivals in and through this new built environment. This is, however, a reality shaped by private sector entities in ways that challenge traditional conceptions of state power. From the construction of key terrain to the mechanisms of engagement and entanglement, the private sector defines the ground and the scope of combat at the technical, tactical and even operational levels. Contractor, proxy and other irregular combatants make up the critical talent pool and provide unique capacities that form the basis of opposing forces, and increasingly appear to act as key decisionmakers in the course of ongoing campaigns. We will explore the development and contribution of privatized intelligence and offensive capabilities for espionage, influence, sabotage and direct action in political warfare, covert action and overt conventional conflict between states, and involving nonstate actors. We will consider the evolution of warning, defensive and countering operations in the cyber domain as a result of these complexities, and explore the implications of this new privatized military expertise and capacity as an increasingly commodified market as we seek to identify the boundaries, histories, and ultimately the factors that will likely shape the futures of hostilities via the virtual medium.

**Panel 2B: creating the soldiers of the state**

**Beyond a national frame: the making of female soldiers in war**

**Rachel Zhou, PhD Candidate, London School of Economics**

Why has there been a global increase of women in the military since the end of WWII? Despite the attentiveness to war as an “external” force, military sociologists and historians usually situate changes including gender-based personnel policies with a national frame where including those formerly excluded from military service is deemed as always already progressive and liberal, as part of the teleological and inevitable process of the national history. However, a national frame can hardly account for women’s entry into the military as a transnational phenomenon.

This article tries to account for the “global.” Instead of narrating the global emergence of female soldiers in a national and progressivist frame, it argues that war as historical and international processes makes a difference to women’s entry into the military. The international as a contact zone is co-constitutive of states and societies, involving self-other relations, such that “internal” identities and processes imply and are in conversation with the “external.” The co-constitution between the self and the other takes place in and is conditioned by the global context at a certain historical moment while their interaction in turn shapes the global history. For another, war is a particular kind of contact zone where contacts between parties involved are hardly in any party’s control and tend to challenge, rework, transform or reinforce their identities and acts at the battlefield in unexpected ways. The integration of women in the military globally is a historical phenomenon made possible at least partly by interactions in war as a contact zone, which in turn performs the identity, shapes the battlefield and reworks the international where women’s presence in the military is now globally regarded as both legitimate, feasible and desirable.